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ANIMALS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
By Marco Roscini*
I. INTRODUCTION
Animals have played a crucial part in mankind’s war efforts since time immemorial.1 
Hannibal’s army famously crossed the Alps in 218 BC riding elephants on its way to 
Rome. Horses have been used in chariot warfare, cavalry tactics and, after the invention 
of gunpowder, as draught animals for heavy artillery and cannons. Camel-mounted troops 
have been employed in desert campaigns, and horses, donkeys, mules and oxen have 
carried food, water, ammunitions and medical supplies to men at the front. Dogs have 
proved particularly important in warfare thanks to their heightened sense of smell in 
locating and detecting hidden explosives and improvised explosive devices and in 
searching out for wounded soldiers.2 Dogs as well as pigeons have also been employed 
to deliver messages, canaries to detect poisonous gas, and cats to hunt rats in trenches. In 
recent times, dolphins and sea lions have been used to clear mines, for instance from the 
Iraqi port of Umm Qasr during the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom.3 Dolphins and other 
marine mammals can also carry cameras and hunt for enemy scuba divers. Finally, dogs, 
cats and other animals have served as pets and military mascots to raise morale and 
provide comfort to soldiers at the front.
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1
 War memorials to animals have been erected in several cities: the one in London, opened in 2004, is 
dedicated to those animals who served and died alongside British and Allied forces in wars and campaigns 
throughout time. The monument has a website: http://www.animalsinwar.org.uk/.
2
 On the use of dogs for military purposes in the United States, see S. D. Cruse, “Military Working Dogs: 
Classification and Treatment in the U.S. Armed Forces”, 21 Animal L. 249 (2014-2015). The US War Dog 
Program began during the Second World War after the Pearl Harbour attack (ibid. at 254).
3
 M. Woods “Flipper goes to war” (27 March 2003) 
http://www.postgazette.com/healthscience/20030327dolphinscip2.asp. The US Navy has an entire program 
dedicated to the studying, training and deployment of marine mammals (available at 
http://www.public.navy.mil/spawar/Pacific/71500/Pages/default.aspx).
2The list of possible uses of animals in warfare could continue. What is important to 
remember, however, is that animals are not only supporting actors in wars between 
humans, but also victims. Indeed, animals are killed and injured not only when they take 
part in hostilities, but also as an incidental consequence of attacks on other objectives.4 
Animals may be negatively affected by hostilities in other ways too. In Africa’s Great 
Lakes region, for instance, elephants are killed and their ivory is smuggled by armed 
groups involved in non-international armed conflicts to buy weapons and ammunitions.5 
Animals have also been used in the testing of weapons.6
In spite of the above, the law of armed conflict has almost exclusively focused on the 
protection of human beings. It is not only the black-letter rules that have largely ignored 
the issue of animals in armed conflict: to the best of this author’s knowledge, there is also 
no international law monograph or article specifically dedicated to this issue, apart from 
one exception (which contains only limited analysis of the existing rules and mainly 
focuses on considerations de lege ferenda).7 Not even a cursory discussion of the role of 
animals in war is made in any leading treatise on the law of armed conflict with the 
exception of Professor Dinstein’s book, which briefly refers to them in the context of the 
definition of “military objective”.8
The present article, then, is the first ever in-depth study of how the law of armed 
conflict applies to animals and fills a serious gap in the literature. The problem has 
become of great significance in the light of the public opinion’s increasing sensibility 
towards animal welfare and the emergence of animal rights theories.9 Indeed, “the welfare 
of individual animals (whether wild or domesticated) is emerging as a significant and 
4
 For example, thousands of sea birds, as well as turtles, sea snakes, fish, shrimps and crabs died as a direct 
result of the oil spill caused by Iraq at the end of the 1991 conflict in the Persian Gulf (A. Leibler, 
“Deliberate Wartime Environmental Damage: New Challenges for International Law”, 23 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 
67, 127 (1992-1993)).
5
 B. Christy, “How Killing Elephants Finances Terror in Africa”, National Geographic, Aug 12, 2015, 
http://www.nationalgeographic.com/tracking-ivory/article.html.
6
 G. L. Francione, “Animals as Property”, 2 Animal L. i, vi (1996).
7
 K. Nowrot, “Animals at War: The Status of ‘Animal Soldiers’ under International Humanitarian Law”, 
40 Historical Social Research 128 (2015).
8
 Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, 106 (3rd ed. 2016).
9
 Animal rights theories go from those who argue that animals only have a limited set of rights to those, 
like the abolitionists, who argue that no animal is the property of humans and all uses by humans of animals, 
including food, clothing, amusement or experiments, should be abolished (G. L. Francione, Introduction to 
Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog, xxix (2000).
3pervasive concern of the international community …”.10 From this perspective, it has 
been observed that “[t]he jus in bello … presents itself as a particularly suitable research 
and reference field for a political theory of animal rights, because in light of current and 
future technological developments this area of public international law is highly likely — 
and considerably more urgent and accentuated than other legal fields — to be confronted 
with the practical relevant issue [of] whether to enlarge its scope of applications to actors 
other than humans and those traditional subjects of law comprising of humans”.11 As a 
consequence, “the legal policy fora and discourses on international humanitarian law are, 
compared to those in other areas of law, currently and in the foreseeable future 
considerably more receptive towards seriously discussing questions concerning the 
possible recognition of a legal status for animals”.12
The main purposes of this article are to assess whether the existing rules of the law of 
armed conflict provide adequate protection to animals and to highlight the fault lines in 
the law. The article will distinguish the general provisions of the law of armed conflict, 
i.e. those that were not adopted with specific regard to animals but the application of 
which might restrict the killing and injuring of animals, from the provisions that 
specifically provide protection to animals. To interpret these rules, the article will make 
use of the rules on interpretation contained in Articles 31-33 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which generally codify pre-existing customary 
international law and, therefore, are applicable also to treaties concluded before the entry 
into force of the Convention.13 The analysis will essentially focus on the killing and 
injuring of animals in the conduct of hostilities, and will only incidentally refer to the 
exploitation of natural resources, pillage, and seizure of property in occupied territories, 
because that would be another whole essay.14 The article will also not address the question 
of the applicability of peacetime animal welfare treaties during armed conflict. One point 
on terminology: although humans are of course also “animals” from a biological 
10
 M. Bowman, P. Davies & C. Redgwell, Lyster’s International Wildlife Law, 698 (2nd ed., 2010).
11




 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
14
 The International Criminal Court (ICC), for instance, convicted Germain Katanga for pillage, inter alia, 
of livestock committed by his militias (Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment, 8 March 2014, 
paras. 949-957). On pillage, seizure and use of property in occupied territories, see Y. Dinstein, The 
International Law of Belligerent Occupation, 195-209 (2009).
4perspective, the present study will employ this expression to refer exclusively to non-
human species. 
II. GENERAL RULES OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT WHICH RESTRICT 
THE KILLING AND THE INJURING OF ANIMALS
This Section focuses on the general rules of the law of armed conflict, i.e. those that 
were not adopted with specific regard to animals, and explores if and how they provide 
effective protection to them in the conduct of hostilities. These rules include: the 
prohibition of wanton destruction and seizure of enemy property, the principles of 
distinction and proportionality, the prohibition of superfluous injury and unnecessary 
suffering, the rules providing special protection to certain objects, and those prohibiting 
or restricting the use of certain weapons. 
A. THE PROHIBITION OF WANTON DESTRUCTION AND SEIZURE OF ANIMALS 
QUALIFYING AS “ENEMY’S PROPERTY”
Article 23(g) of the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
annexed to the 1899 Hague Convention II and to the 1907 Hague Convention IV provides 
that it is prohibited “[t]o destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction 
or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war”.15 This rule reflects 
customary international law and now applies in both international and non-international 
armed conflicts.16
Article 23(g) refers to “enemy’s property”. There is no definition of “property” in the 
Hague Regulations: do animals qualify as such? This issue has been the subject of debate 
in animal law scholarship. While welfarist scholars maintain that it is ethically acceptable 
to continue to see animals as “property” but advocate for a more humane treatment, others 
(the “abolitionists”) argue for the elimination of property status and for making at least 
15
 Text in Documents on the Laws of War, 73 (3rd ed., A. Roberts & R. Guelf eds., 2000) (hereinafter: 
Documents on the Laws of War).
16
 J.-M. Henckaerts & D. Constantin, “Protection of the Natural Environment” in The Oxford Handbook of 
International Law in Armed Conflict, 470, 472 (A. Clapham & P. Gaeta eds., 2014). Note that art. 23(g) 
applies regardless of the amount of damage caused.
5some animals legal persons.17 Among the former group, David Favre has suggested that 
a fourth category of property, living property, should be added to the traditional ones (real 
property, personal property and intellectual property) so to include vertebrate animals.18 
According to Favre, “some animals, but not all animals, should possess some but not all 
possible legal rights” and continue to be classified as “property”.19 These views are 
challenged by Gary Francione, a leading abolitionist scholar, who argues that “the liberal 
theory of property assumes that animals have no interests, or, at least, no interests that 
will prevail against human interests. That is the whole point of classifying animals as 
“property.” Indeed, to classify something as property in the legal sense is to say that the 
thing is to be regarded solely as a means to the end to be determined by human property 
owners”.20 For Francione, then, animals, as sentient beings, should not be classified as 
property, but as legal persons. If this view is accepted and animals cease to qualify as 
“property”, Article 23(g) would not apply to them. Francione’s position, however, does 
not reflect the lex lata: in the context of the law of armed conflict, in particular, State 
practice and case-law clearly show that animals are considered in the context of the 
provisions protecting private and public property. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims 
Commission (EECC), for instance, found “extensive evidence of [the] gratuitous, and 
patently unlawful, slaughter and burning of the goats, sheep, donkeys and cattle so critical 
to the survival of rural civilians” and, consequently, found Ethiopia in violation of its 
obligations under applicable international humanitarian law and “liable to compensate 
Eritrea for the damage caused by those acts”.21 In the final award, the Commission also 
noted that there is not necessarily a clear separation between losses of property and deaths 
or personal injury, because “[i]n poor countries like Ethiopia and Eritrea, with low 
incomes and life expectancies, security of property often is vital to survival. Property such 
as livestock, farmers’ tools, utensils and houses has a direct impact on one’s possibility 
17
 See D. Favre, “Living Property: A New Status for Animals within the Legal System”, 93 Marquette L. 
R. 1021, 1023 (2009-2010). See also T. L. Bryant, “Similarity or Difference as a Basis for Justice: Must 
Animals be like Humans to be Legally Protected from Humans?”, 70 Law & Contemp. Probs. 207, 209 
(2007); K. Sykes, “‘Nations Like Unto Yourselves’: An Inquiry into the Status of a General Principle of 
International Law on Animal Welfare”, 49 Canad. Y.B. Int’l L. 3, 9 (2011).
18
 See Favre, supra note 17, at. 1042-1047.
19
 Ibid. at 1032.
20
 Gary L. Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law, 46 (2005).
21
 EECC, Partial Award, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea’s Claims 1, 3, 
5, 9–13, 14, 21, 25 & 26, 19 December 2005, paras. 29-30, in 26 R.I.A.A. 291.
6to survive. Thus, awards of compensation for loss or destruction of property frequently 
stem from serious threats to physical integrity”.22
But do wildlife and stray animals also qualify as “enemy’s property”? The ordinary 
meaning of “property” is “a thing or things belonging to someone”.23 If “property” is 
interpreted according to its ordinary meaning, then, it would at best include farm and zoo 
animals as well as pets, but not wild, stray or unowned animals: as has been noted, “[t]hat 
a living being lives upon or crosses over the real property of a human does not constitute 
possession of that living being for this purpose. Wild beings within natural ecosystems 
are not personal property. While governments assert the right to control access to wild 
animals, they do not have possessory rights or ownership of wild animals”.24 There are, 
however, at least two arguments that militate against an interpretation of Article 23(g) 
limited to domestic animals. The first is that this interpretation is not necessarily 
consistent with the object and purpose of the provision, which arguably is to protect a 
belligerent and its nationals against unnecessary economic losses.25 Wildlife can be 
subject to different forms of exploitation, such as hunting and fishing, and its destruction 
can indeed be an economic loss. Secondly, the US Law of War Manual defines “enemy 
property” as “[a]ll property located in enemy territory … regardless of its ownership”.26 
If this definition is correct, Article 23(g) would cover all animals that are present in enemy 
territory, regardless of whether they are domesticated, wild or stray, privately or State 
owned. The animals falling outside the scope of Article 23(g) would only be those owned 
by the belligerent conducting the military operation, or by a neutral State or their nationals 
(unless such animals are located in enemy territory), and those located in neutral territory 
22
 EECC, Final Award, Ethiopia’s Damages Claims, Decision of 17 August 2009, para. 4, in 26 R.I.A.A. 
631.
23
 The Oxford Compact English Dictionary, 907 (2nd ed., C. Soanes ed., 2003).
24
 Favre, supra note 17, at 1044. See also Leibler, supra note 4, at 105-106.
25
 Art. 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties includes, among the main criteria for 
interpretation, not only the literal one, but also those which take into account a) the context and b) the object 
and purpose of the provision.
26
 US Department of Defense, Law of War Manual, June 2015 (Updated December 2016), 286.
7or beyond the sovereignty of States (unless they are owned by the enemy belligerent or 
its nationals).27
Article 23(g) applies not only to “attacks” as defined in Article 49(1) of Additional 
Protocol I, but to all seizure, destruction or damage that is the consequence of military 
operations, such as military movements and manœuvres. If attacks may only be directed 
against military objectives,28 then, the destruction and seizure under Article 23(g) may 
also occur in relation to property that does not qualify as a military objective, so long as 
they are justified by imperative military necessity and unless they are limited by other 
specific regulation. In the Hostage case, the US Military Tribunal clarified that 
“imperative necessities of war” require that there is “some reasonable connection between 
the destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy forces”.29 The killing of 
animals by a retreating army to delay the advance of the enemy or the seizure of horses 
to be used as means of transportation by combatants, then, would be entirely permissible 
under Article 23(g).30 The same cannot be said of the killing and seizure of pets in order 
to affect the morale of civilians. The rule under examination also does not necessarily 
prohibit the killing of animals incidental to military operations and movements: as the 
principle of proportionality only applies to attacks, in the case of other military operations 
that lead incidentally to the killing of animals the test will be whether or not such 
incidental destruction is justified by considerations of imperative military necessity.31
27
 It should also be noted that, under art. 4 of the Hague Regulations and art. 18(1) of Geneva Convention 
III relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, horses may be confiscated from prisoners of war even if 
they are their personal property.
28
 See below, Section II.B. If the property qualifies as a military objective, the destruction under art. 23(g) 
is ipso facto justified by imperative necessities of war.
29
 United States v. W. List and others (Hostage case), 8 Trials of War Criminals 34, 66 (1949). As has been 
observed, the “predicaments lie in determining how direct the advantage that accrues to the military actor 
has to be, and, if direct enough, how likely the advantage sought is to occur” (M. N. Schmitt, “War and the 
Environment: Fault Lines in the Prescriptive Landscape”, 37 Archiv des Völkerrechts 25, 45 (1999)).
30
 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch & W. Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts, 320 (1982). The 
Nuremberg war crimes tribunals found that even extensive destruction by retreating armies may be justified 
by the imperative necessities of war under art. 23(g) of the Hague Regulations (The High Command Case 
(US v. von Lebb), 12 Trials of War Criminals 1, 125 (1949); The Hostage Case, supra note 29, at 69). It 
should be recalled, however, that art. 57(1) of Additional Protocol I requires that “constant care shall be 
taken to spare … civilian objects” in all military operations, not only in attacks (text of the Protocol in 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3).
31
 Bothe, Partsch and Solf, supra note 30, at 320; US Law of War Manual, supra note 26, at 288.
8The language of Article 23(g) is essentially repeated in Article 53 of the 1949 Geneva 
Convention IV relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, which 
prohibits the destruction of property by the Occupying Power in the context of belligerent 
occupation “except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military 
operations”.32 Unlike Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations, which applies to the entire 
territory of the belligerent parties, Article 53 only covers property in occupied territory.33 
It protects animals that are the “private property of protected persons (owned individually 
or collectively), State property, that of the public authorities (districts, municipalities, 
provinces, etc.) or of co-operative organizations”.34 The considerations with regard to 
wildlife made above in relation to Article 23(g) can be extended to Article 53. The 
protection is subordinated to “absolute” military necessity: there does not seem to be a 
significant difference of meaning between “absolute” and “imperative” necessities of war 
as used in Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations and Article 53 of Geneva Convention 
IV.35
The wanton destruction of property, including animals, is a grave breach of the Geneva 
Conventions and a war crime,36 but it could also be an element of the crime against 
humanity of persecution. In the Kupreškić case, the ICTY Trial Chamber found that the 
Muslim population’s livestock, which were killed by military units of the Hrvatsko Vijeće 
Obrane (HVO) and members of the Jokers during the attack on Ahmici on 16 April 1993, 
“had for their owners not only economic value, but also and probably even more 
importantly, emotional, psychological and cultural significance”.37 The Trial Chamber 
further noted that the attack “was not a combat operation. Rather, it was a well-planned 
and well-organized killing of civilian members of an ethnic group, the Muslims, by the 
military of another ethnic group, the Croats. The primary purpose of the massacre was to 
32
 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
33
 Commentary, IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 301 
(J. Pictet ed., 1958). Unlike art. 23(g) of the Hague Regulations, art. 53 only mentions destruction and not 
also seizure.
34
 Pictet, supra note 33, at 301.
35
 See Dinstein, supra note 14, at 196.
36
 See art. 147 of Geneva Convention IV, art. 6(b) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg, art. 3(b) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), art. 8(2)(a)(iv), art. 8(2)(b)(xiii) and art. 8(2)(e)(xii) of ICC Statute.
37
 Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić and others, IT-95-16-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 14 January 2000, 
para. 336.
9expel the Muslims from the village, by killing many of them, by burning their houses and 
their livestock, and by illegally detaining and deporting the survivors to another area. The 
ultimate goal of these acts was to spread terror among the population so as to deter the 
members of that particular ethnic group from ever returning to their homes”.38 The same 
point is reiterated in Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez: “when the cumulative 
effect of such property destruction is the removal of civilians from their homes on 
discriminatory grounds, the ‘wanton and extensive destruction and/or plundering of … 
livestock’ may constitute the crime of persecution”.39
B. THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION: ANIMALS AS “OBJECTS”
Article 48 of the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions on the 
Protection of Victims of War provides for the obligation of the belligerent parties to “at 
all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian 
objects and military objectives and accordingly [to] direct their operations only against 
military objectives”. Article 52(1) of the Protocol reiterates that “[c]ivilian objects shall 
not be the object of attack or of reprisals” and Article 52(2) affirms that “[a]ttacks shall 
be limited strictly to military objectives”. This obligation of distinction also applies in 
non-international armed conflicts, as can be inferred from Common Article 3(1) of the 
Geneva Conventions, which prohibits “violence to life and person” on those “taking no 
active part in hostilities”,40 and more explicitly from Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol 
II (even though only with regard to civilians and the civilian population, and not civilian 
objects).41
38
 Ibid., para. 749.
39
 Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 26 February 
2001, para. 205.
40
 A.P.V. Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, 305 (3rd ed., 2012).
41
 Rule 10 of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law on the protection of civilian objects against attack, however, applies both to international 
and non-international armed conflicts (Customary International Humanitarian Law, vol. I, 34 (J.-M. 
Henckaerts & L. Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) (hereinafter: ICRC Study)).
10
The customary status of the principle of distinction is well established.42 On 19 
December 1969, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2444 by unanimous vote, 
which expressly recognised the principle of civilian immunity and its corollary requiring 
the parties to a conflict to distinguish civilians from combatants at all times.43 The United 
States acknowledged that the Resolution is declaratory of customary international law.44 
The customary nature of the principle of distinction has also been upheld by national and 
international courts: in particular, according to the 1996 International Court of Justice 
(ICJ)’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the 
obligation to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants is an “intransgressible 
[principle] of international customary law” that is “to be observed by all States whether 
or not they have ratified the conventions that contain” it.45 According to the ICTY, “it is 
now a universally recognized principle . . . that deliberate attacks on civilians or civilian 
objects are absolutely prohibited by international humanitarian law”.46 The ICTY has also 
in several cases affirmed that, as far as customary international law is concerned, the 
prohibition of attacks on civilians and civilian objects applies both in international and 
non-international armed conflicts.47
If attacks, as defined in Article 49(1) of Additional Protocol I,48 may only be directed 
against military objectives, when do animals qualify as such? Animals are not expressly 
considered in the rules that spell out the principle of distinction. There are, then, three 
possible interpretive solutions: 1) animals fall under the same classification as humans 
42
 Ibid. at 3. See also C. Greenwood, “Customary Law Status of the 1977 Additional Protocols” in 
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict – Challenges Ahead, 108 (A. J. M. Delissen & G. J. Tanja eds., 
1991); US Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (1992), 31 
I.L.M. 621-622 (1992).
43
 GA Resolution 2444, 19 December 1968. The preamble to this Resolution states that these fundamental 
humanitarian law principles apply “in all armed conflicts”, both international and internal.
44
 A. W. Rovine, “Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law”, 67 A.J.I.L. 
118, 122 (1973).
45
 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 226 (1996) 
(hereinafter: Nuclear Weapons), paras. 78–79.
46
 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, supra note 37, para. 521. See also EECC, supra note 21, para. 95.
47
 See, e.g. Prosecutor v Tadić, Case No IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, 10 
August 1995, para. 127.
48
 Art. 49(1) of the Protocol defines “attacks” as “acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence 
or in defence”.
11
(combatants/civilians) and constitute military objectives when they have combatant 
status; 2) animals are “objects” (interpreted as a residual notion that includes everything 
but human beings) and are military objectives when the requirements of Article 52(2) of 
Additional Protocol I are met; or 3) animals are neither combatants/civilians nor objects, 
and the law of armed conflict is silent on the conditions under which they may be military 
objectives. These three alternatives will be explored in turn.
Starting from the first hypothesis, Article 43(2) of Additional Protocol I qualifies the 
members of the armed forces of a belligerent party as combatants. If “[t]he main 
characteristic of members of the armed forces is that they are trained to engage in combat 
and fire weapons”,49 then at least certain animals could qualify as combatants. A 
legislative proposal submitted to the US Congress, the US Canine Members of the Armed 
Forces Act, provided, for instance, that military working dogs should not be considered 
as “equipment” but should be reclassified as canine members of the armed forces.50 In 
some cases, at least unofficially, dogs have been given a military rank and wear a sign 
distinctive of their rank on their body armour.51 It also seems that captured military 
working dogs could be involved in prisoners of war exchanges between the coalition 
forces and the Taliban in the conflict in Afghanistan.52 
The ICRC Commentary of Article 43(2), however, clarifies that “[t]he expression 
‘armed forces’ means ‘members of the armed forces’, i.e., persons, as explicitly stated in 
paragraph 2” and that “[i]n itself it … does not allow, for example, the use of animals 
trained to attack, who are incapable of distinguishing between an able-bodied enemy and 
an enemy who is ‘hors de combat’”.53 Indeed, if they were considered combatants, 
animals would have not only the rights, but also the obligations associated with this status: 
the question, therefore, would be “whether or not the average animal combatant can 
seriously be regarded as being endowed with the capacity to understand and 
49
 Dinstein, supra note 8, at 41.
50
 H.R. 4103 and S. 2134.
51
 Nowrot, supra note 7, at 132.
52
 Ibid. at 128-129.
53
  Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
para. 1672 (Y. Sandoz, C. Zwinarski & B. Zimmermann eds., 1987) (hereinafter: ICRC Commentary) 
(emphasis added).
12
autonomously obey the various legal obligations incumbent upon active participants in 
armed conflicts under international humanitarian law”.54 
Even admitting, for argument’s sake, that certain animals could have combatant status, 
it would be difficult to qualify the animals not enlisted in the armed forces as civilians: 
the definition of “civilians” contained in Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I expressly 
refers to “persons”. It is a significant element of State practice that the above mentioned 
US Canine Members of the Armed Forces Act was eventually not adopted: military 
working dogs, therefore, are still qualified as military “equipment” under US legislation 
and dogs are still not eligible for official military awards.55 All in all, if an animal is used 
by combatants in hostilities, it constitutes a means of warfare, but it is not a combatant 
itself.56
The second option is that animals are considered “objects” for the purposes of the 
application of the principle of distinction. Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I, which 
reflects customary international law,57 provides that “[i]n so far as objects are concerned, 
military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or 
use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a 
definite military advantage”.58 “In so far as objects are concerned” has been widely 
interpreted as implying that there are other categories, in addition to objects, that 
constitute military objectives and may thus be the target of an attack, in particular 
combatants, members of organized armed groups in non-international armed conflicts, 
civilians taking direct part in hostilities, and participants in a levée en masse: the notion 
of “military objective”, in other words, is broader than that of “object”.59 The conditions 
54
 Nowrot, supra note 7, at 140.
55
 Cruse, supra note 2, at 251-252, 280.
56
 As to veterinary personnel, the US Law of War Manual provides that “veterinary personnel qualify for 
military medical status, if they are exclusively engaged in providing health services for military personnel 
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 The ICRC Commentary clarifies that “the definition [contained in art. 52(2)] is limited to objects but it 
is clear that members of the armed forces are military objectives” (ICRC Commentary, para. 2017). There 
are, however, also different interpretations that see art. 52(2) as applying to all military objectives, not only 
objects: the 2013 German Military Manual, for instance, includes the armed forces of a party to the conflict 
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under which non-objects constitute military objectives, however, are not those spelt out 
in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I.60
But are animals “objects” for the purposes of Article 52(2)? It has been suggested, for 
instance, that animals that contribute to the belligerents’ military effort are “matériel” 
falling under the scope of Article 52(2).61 The ordinary meaning of the word “object”, 
however, encompasses only inanimate things.62 This conclusion seems to find support in 
the ICRC Commentary, which defines “objects” as “tangible and visible things”.63 The 
travaux préparatoires of Article 52(2) also suggest that the notion of “object” is limited 
to non-living things.64 
If we resort to contextual interpretation, however, we will find that Article 54 of 
Additional Protocol I refers to livestock animals as “objects”. Furthermore, the French 
and Spanish versions of Article 52(2) employ the expressions “biens”/“bienes”, which 
translate into English as “assets”, “goods”, “possession” or “property”.65 All these 
among the “objects” considered to be military objectives (Federal Ministry of Defence, Law of Armed 
Conflict Manual, Joint Service Regulation (ZDv) 15/2, May 2013, para. 407).
60
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expressions have a broader meaning than “object” and are not limited to inanimate things, 
but also include living beings that are susceptible of appropriation and ownership. The 
ICRC Commentary is also more ambiguous than it would seem at first sight: the reference 
to “tangible and visible things” was made to exclude “the general objective (in the sense 
of aim or purpose) of a military operation”,66 and not to differentiate between living and 
inanimate targets.
The third interpretive solution is that animals are considered a third category of 
military objectives, distinct from human beings and objects. In the third edition of The 
Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, for instance, 
Professor Dinstein appears to see “other living creatures” like animals as a separate 
category of possible awful targets, in addition to objects, combatants and civilians taking 
direct part in hostilities.67 This interpretation, which limits “objects” to inanimate things, 
is however inconsistent with the object and purpose of Additional Protocol I and of 
Article 52(2) in particular. The object and purpose of Additional Protocol I is to “improve 
the protection provided by the [Geneva] Conventions to the victims of international armed 
conflicts”,68 and the specific object and purpose of the definition of “military objective” 
contained in Article 52(2) is to facilitate the application of the principle of distinction in 
attacks. Under Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, between 
two or more possible interpretations we must choose the one most consonant with this 
object and purpose. If animals amount to a third category falling outside the scope of 
Articles 43 and 52(2) of Additional Protocol I, the undesirable normative consequence is 
that both the criteria to determine whether a certain person is a combatant and therefore 
targetable and those to establish whether an object is a military objective would be 
inapplicable to animals. We would be left, therefore, without any valid criterion to 
establish their targetability. This is clearly an unreasonable interpretive result, which is at 
odds with the object and purpose of both Additional Protocol I and its Article 52(2) as 
identified above.
Accordingly, the preferable interpretation appears to be that which considers animals 
as “objects” under Article 52(2). This ensures that animals are protected under the 
principle of distinction when they are a civilian object. As Francione has observed, 
66
 ICRC Commentary, para. 2010.
67
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“[c]ommon-law and civil-law traditions are dualistic in that there are two primary 
normative entities in these systems: persons and things. Animals are treated as things, 
and, more specifically, as the property of persons”.69 The law of armed conflict, and 
Additional Protocol I in particular, incorporate this traditional dualistic construction. It is 
worth noting that “object” is broader than “property”: unlike in Article 23(g) of the Hague 
Regulations, then, no interpretive problem arises under Article 52(2) in relation to wild 
and stray animals.
If they are indeed considered “objects”, animals may be targeted only if they meet the 
two requirements spelled out in Article 52(2), i.e. when they “by their nature, location, 
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a 
definite military advantage”.70 Horse cavalry, mine-sweeping dolphins and pigeons 
carrying military communications, for instance, would be military objectives by use and 
thus targetable.71 Many animals are likely to be dual-use objects, for instance pack mules 
used both by the military to transport weapons and by civilians to carry water. The fact 
that an object is also used for civilian purposes does not affect its qualification under the 
principle of distinction: if the two requirements provided in Article 52(2) of Additional 
Protocol I are present, the object is a military objective but the neutralization of its civilian 
component needs to be taken into account when assessing the incidental damage on 
civilians and civilian property under the principle of proportionality. What is prohibited 
is to attack the dual-use object because of its civilian function or to attack a dual use 
object where the anticipated military value of the attack is outweighed by the expected 
civilian damage and/or injury. It should also be recalled that, under Article 52(3) of 
Additional Protocol I, “[i]n case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated 
to civilian purposes . . . is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, 
69
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it shall be presumed not to be so used”.72 Unlike its counterpart with regard to persons 
(Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I), the customary status of this provision is dubious.
C. THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY AND THE PROBLEMS WITH ITS 
APPLICATION TO ANIMALS
Another reason to consider animals as “objects” under the current law of armed 
conflict is that this allows their inclusion in the proportionality calculation of damage 
incidental to an attack on a military objective. Indeed, Article 51(5)(b) of Additional 
Protocol I provides that an attack is indiscriminate, and thus prohibited, if it “may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated”.73 This provision, commonly referred to as the 
principle of proportionality,74 has been incorporated in several military manuals, 
including the US Law of War Manual,75 the German Military Manual,76 the UK Military 
Manual77, and the French Manuel de droit des conflits armés.78 It reflects customary 
international law and, although it does not appear expressly in Additional Protocol II, it 
is generally accepted that it also applies to attacks in non-international armed conflicts.79
72
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The fact that harm to animals needs to be factored in when calculating the 
proportionality of an attack on a military objective finds support in the ICJ’s 1996 
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, where the 
Court held that “States must take environmental considerations into account when 
assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military 
objectives. Respect for the environment is one of the elements that go to assessing 
whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality” 
(the natural environment includes the fauna).80 Draft Principle 10 of the International Law 
Commission (ILC)’s Draft Principles on the Protection of the environment in relation to 
armed conflict, as provisionally adopted in 2015, also provides that “[e]nvironmental 
considerations shall be taken into account when applying the principle of proportionality 
and the rules on military necessity”.81 The same position was taken in the Final Report to 
the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,82 and several States have also invoked the 
applicability of the principle of proportionality to environmental damage.83 The fact that 
the destruction of livestock may be lawful damage incidental to an attack on a military 
objective is specifically acknowledged by the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Kupreškić case, 
although the Court found that, in the case before it, the damage was not “collateral”, but 
rather “it was the primary purpose of the attack”.84 
The Final Report by the Committee established to Review the NATO Bombing 
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia noted that “[t]he main problem 
with the principle of proportionality is not whether or not it exists but what it means and 
how it is to be applied”.85 This is because “[t]he intellectual process of balancing the 
80
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various elements is so complicated, [and] needs to take into account such a huge amount 
of data and so many factors, that any attempt to design a formula which is both 
comprehensive and precise would be ridiculous”.86 These complexities are even more 
evident when the incidental damage involves animals. Indeed, the value that different 
military actors will attribute to them will greatly vary: the approach of different societies 
and individuals to animals is so diverse that any evaluation of proportionality in this 
context will necessarily be driven by many more variables (of a cultural, economic, 
religious, ideological, philosophical, educational nature) than in its application to human 
beings and inanimate objects. As a consequence, belligerents will likely “arrive at 
disparate conclusions as to the normative boundaries within which [they] must operate”.87 
Those following a utilitarian approach will value animals taking into account only their 
relevance for human well-being and will only include their usefulness to humans in the 
proportionality calculation (for example, the killing of animals will be considered 
relevant because and when it deprives the civilian population of food). The opposite 
approach will consider the animals’ intrinsic value, regardless of their relation to 
humans.88 Between these two extremes, there can be intermediate positions where the 
utilitarian and the intrinsic value approaches are reconciled in different ways, giving 
prevalence to the one or the other depending on the circumstances of the case or the type 
of animal concerned.89
Whatever the preferred approach may be, it should be recalled that the principle of 
proportionality allows even extensive damage to animals if the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated from the attack justifies it. Reverberating and long-term 
effects on animals arising from an attack on a military objective must be considered when 
calculating proportionality to the extent that they can be reasonably expected.90
86
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D. THE PROHIBITION OF SUPERFLUOUS INJURY AND UNNECESSARY 
SUFFERING: DOES IT APPLY TO ANIMALS?
A cardinal principle of the law of armed conflict is the prohibition of means and 
methods of warfare causing superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.91 The 
prohibition first appeared in the Preamble of the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration and is 
contained, with slight language differences, in Article 23(e) of the Hague Regulations of 
1899 and 1907 and Article 35(2) of Additional Protocol I.92 It reflects customary 
international law applicable to both international and non-international armed conflicts.93
The fact that the suffering caused by a weapon is extensive is not sufficient to outlaw 
it: the suffering must be “unnecessary”, i.e. causing “a harm greater than that unavoidable 
to achieve legitimate military objectives”.94 However, as the ICRC concedes, “views 
differ on how it can actually be determined that a weapon causes superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering”.95 While certain opinions require a balance between the military 
advantage gained from the use of the weapon in question and the suffering caused,96 
others resort to a comparative approach: “[s]uffering is unnecessary when, in the 
circumstances, another practicable military means, causing less suffering to the adverse 
combatants, could have been used to place the adversary hors de combat”.97 A third 
approach focuses on the effects of the weapons and the principle of humanity: when the 
91
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suffering they cause are “repugnant to the public conscience”, the weapon is unlawful 
“whatever might be the military advantage sought to be achieved.”98 It has also been 
suggested that factors like whether the weapon renders death inevitable or leads to 
permanent disabilities must be considered.99 Whatever approach is preferred, only 
exceptionally would a weapon cause “unnecessary” suffering in all circumstances. The 
ICRC Commentary of Article 35(2) of Additional Protocol I provides some of the “not 
very numerous” examples.100
While the prohibition of superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering is normally 
interpreted as protecting combatants, the question arises whether it can also be extended 
to certain means of warfare that are sentient beings, i.e. animals. If the St. Petersburg 
Declaration expressly mentions “arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of 
disabled men, or render their death inevitable”,101 both Article 23(e) of the Hague 
Regulations and Article 35(2) of Additional Protocol I refer to means and methods of 
warfare that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, without specifying who 
the protected subject is.102 Reading the ICRC Commentary of Article 35(2), however, it 
becomes clear that the provision was drafted with humans in mind. In particular, the 
Commentary refers to “[t]he prohibitions on inflicting superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering on combatants and civilians”.103 As has been seen in Section II.B., animals do 
not fit well in the dichotomy combatants/civilians. 
The fact remains that neither Article 23(e) of the Hague Regulations nor Article 35(2) 
of Additional Protocol I specify the protected subject. This allows an evolutionary 
interpretation of the norms under consideration that extends the prohibition of superfluous 
injury and unnecessary suffering to animals. In the Advisory Opinion on the Legal 
98
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Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), the ICJ found that 
“an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of 
the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation”.104 The concept of 
evolutionary interpretation, which is also implied in Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties,105 was employed again by the Court in a subsequent 
judgment, where it held that “where parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the parties 
necessarily having been aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over 
time, and where the treaty has been entered into for a very long period or is “of continuing 
duration”, the parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those terms 
to have an evolving meaning”.106 Indeed, as recalled by the former President of the Israeli 
Supreme Court, Aharon Barak, “new reality at times requires new interpretation. Rules 
developed against the background of a reality which has changed must take on a dynamic 
interpretation which adapts them, in the framework of accepted interpretational rules, to 
the new reality”.107 The arguments in favour of evolutionary interpretation apply strongly 
to the law of armed conflict: the forward-looking character of this law is demonstrated by 
the inclusion in Additional Protocol I of Article 36 on the study, development, acquisition 
or adoption of a new weapon, means, or method of warfare, and of the Martens Clause.108 
As reaffirmed in Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol I, in particular, the Martens Clause 
provides that “[i]n cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, 
civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of 
international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and 
104
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from the dictates of public conscience”. A 1961 recommendation by the Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe declared that “the humane treatment of animals is one 
of the hallmarks of Western civilisation”.109 The 1958 UN Conference on the Law of the 
Sea adopted unanimously a resolution requesting States “to prescribe, by all means 
available to them, those methods for the capture and killing of marine life, especially of 
whales and seals, which will spare them suffering to the greatest extent possible”.110 A 
prohibition of the unnecessary suffering of animals also appears, among others, in Article 
5 of the 1935 International Convention Concerning the Transit of Animals, Article 5 of 
the 1950 Convention for the Protection of Birds, Article 6 of the 1976 European 
Convention for the Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes, Articles 12, 17 and 
32 of the 1979 European Convention for the Protection of Animals for Slaughter, Articles 
3, 7, 11 and 12 of the 1987 European Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals, 
Article 3(6) of Annex II to the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic 
Treaty. While these Conventions do not automatically apply in armed conflict,111 they 
contribute to shaping the “principles of humanity” and the “dictates of public conscience” 
referred to in the Martens Clause and allow an evolutionary (re)interpretation of a 
provision – the prohibition of unnecessary suffering – originally conceived only in 
relation to human beings. Several states have also maintained that the “dictates of public 
conscience” now include avoiding unnecessary and extensive damage to the natural 
environment, which includes the fauna,112 and have adopted anti-animal cruelty laws, 
with some countries recognizing animals as sentient beings worth of protection and 
compassion even in their constitutions:113 as has been observed, “the existence of these 
109
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laws clearly reflects the legislatures’ acceptance of the proposition that an animal’s 
interest in being free from unnecessary pain and suffering should be recognized as a value 
within the legal system”.114 Some authors have suggested that there is now a general 
principle of law in the sense of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute that contemplates animal 
welfare and that is “relevant to the interpretation and amplification of norms established 
by other means”.115
It can be argued, then, that the principle of unnecessary suffering now applies not only 
to humans, but also to animals. Having said that, it should be kept in mind that the 
measure of the unnecessary character of suffering is different in animal welfare law and 
in the law of armed conflict: while the latter balances it against considerations of military 
necessity, the former refers to situations where the suffering is not required by a legitimate 
form of animal exploitation.
E. OTHER GENERAL PROVISIONS THAT MIGHT RESULT IN SOME PROTECTION 
OF ANIMALS
Some protection for animals also indirectly results from the application of other rules 
of the law of armed conflict, such as Article 56 of Additional Protocol I and Article 15 of 
Additional Protocol II (protection of works and installations containing dangerous 
forces). Animals must also be “respected and protected” when they are exclusively used 
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as means of medical transportation.116 Article 8(g) of Additional Protocol I defines 
“medical transport” as “any means of transportation, whether military or civilian, 
permanent or temporary, assigned exclusively to medical transportation and under the 
control of a competent authority of a Party to the conflict”.117 The Commentary specifies 
that “this provision covers ‘any’ means of transportation: none is excluded, from the 
oxdrawn cart to the supersonic jet, or any future means of transportation”.118 The Spanish 
Military Manual also states that medical means of transportation for the evacuation of the 
injured and sick include animals used for medical services on mountains.119 The 
protection of animals as a means of medical transport ceases if they are “used to commit, 
outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy”.120 Protection is also granted 
to animals used by civil defence organizations121 or to provide humanitarian relief.122
Animals considered sacred in certain religions are not specifically protected by the 
existing rules of the law of armed conflict. Additional Protocols I and II protect places, 
not objects, of worship (Article 53 of Additional Protocol I and Article 16 of Additional 
Protocol II). Some indirect protection, however, may derive from Article 27 of Geneva 
Convention IV, which provides that “[p]rotected persons are entitled, in all 
circumstances, to respect for … their religious convictions and practices, and their 
manners and customs”. Article 75(1) of Additional Protocol I also provides that “[e]ach 
Party shall respect the person, honour, convictions and religious practices of” those falling 
116
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under the protective scope of this provision:123 this might prohibit, for instance, the killing 
of sacred animals in the presence of the individuals who worship them.
Treaties prohibiting or restricting the use of certain weapons can also play a role in 
ensuring some level of animal protection in armed conflict. Some of these treaties 
expressly refer to animals. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, for instance, 
forbids, inter alia, the use of toxic chemicals defined as “any chemical which through its 
chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent 
harm to human or animals”.124 An express reference to animals is also contained in Article 
7(1)(j) of the Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-
Traps and Other Devices, as amended in 1996, which prohibits “in all circumstances to 
use booby-traps and other devices which are in any way attached to or associated with: 
… animals or their carcasses”.125 Under the Protocol, then, it is prohibited to use animals, 
either alive or dead, to conceal explosives. Article I of the Final Document of the Sixth 
Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
Weapons and on their Destruction provides that “the Convention is comprehensive in its 
scope and that all naturally or artificially created or altered microbial and other biological 
agents and toxins, as well as their components, regardless of their origin and method of 
production and whether they affect humans, animals or plants, of types and in quantities 
that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, are 
unequivocally covered by Article I” of the Convention and that “experimentation 
involving open-air release of pathogens or toxins harmful to humans, animals and plants 
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that have no justification for prophylactic, protective of other peaceful purposes is 
inconsistent with the undertakings contained in Article I”.126
3. RULES SPECIFICALLY PROTECTING ANIMALS IN ARMED CONFLICT
There are only a handful of rules in the current law of armed conflict that specifically 
provide protection to animals during the conduct of hostilities. As far as treaty law is 
concerned, the only provisions are Articles 35(3), 54 and 55 of Additional Protocol I and 
Article 14 of Additional Protocol II. With the possible exception of Article 35(3), these 
rules do not protect animals because of their intrinsic value, but because of their 
importance for human beings.
A.  PROTECTION OF LIVESTOCK AS AN OBJECT INDISPENSABLE TO THE 
SURVIVAL OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION
According to Article 54 of Additional Protocol I, “[i]t is prohibited to attack, destroy, 
remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, 
such as … livestock …, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance 
value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in 
order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive”.127 As 
it is clear from its formulation, the provision adopts an anthropocentric approach and 
protects livestock animals like cows, sheep and chickens not per se, but because and when 
they are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. The provision’s object 
126
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and purpose, then, is not the protection of animals, but the prohibition of starvation of 
civilians as a method of warfare.128
The list of objects contained in Article 54 is not exhaustive: animals other than 
livestock could also be encompassed. The provision, however, is limited in its protective 
scope. First, it does not cover all livestock (or other animals), but only those indispensable 
to the survival of the civilian population: this is necessarily a contextual assessment that 
depends not on the type of animal, but on the circumstances of each case (for instance, 
whether food reserves are available).129 Secondly, Article 54 only prohibits actions 
against animals undertaken “for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance 
value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party”.130 Article 54, then, does not 
prohibit the killing of livestock for other legitimate purposes. Collateral damage to 
livestock is also not a violation of Article 54 “as long as the intention was to gain a 
military advantage by attacking a military objective”.131 Thirdly, as noted in the ICRC 
Commentary of this provision, Article 54 only applies to objects “located in the territory 
held by the Party to the conflict concerned or that of a co-belligerent as well as in enemy 
territory”:132 “[i]f they come by sea, the fate of such objects depends on the provisions of 
the laws of war applicable to ships transporting them”, in particular the law of naval 
blockades.133 Fourthly, the protection under Article 54 ceases if animals “are used by an 
adverse Party: (a) as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces; or (b) if not 
as sustenance, then in direct support of military action, provided, however, that in no 
event shall actions against these objects be taken which may be expected to leave the 
civilian population with such inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force 
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its movement”.134 Finally, Article 54 does not prohibit the killing of animals by a party 
to the conflict “in the defence of its national territory against invasion … within such 
territory under its own control where required by imperative military necessity”.135 A 
belligerent, then, may destroy objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population, including livestock, in that part of its own territory under its control, although 
only when this is required by imperative military necessity.136 
Language similar to that of Article 54 also appears in Article 14 of Additional Protocol 
II in relation to non-international armed conflicts, although in a much more concise 
formulation: as a consequence, scorched earth policies are prohibited in an armed conflict 
not of an international character.137 Both Article 54 and Article 14 reflect customary 
international law.138
B. PROTECTION OF ANIMALS AS AN ELEMENT OF THE “NATURAL 
ENVIRONMENT”
Article 55(1) of Additional Protocol I provides that “[c]are shall be taken in warfare 
to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage. This 
protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are 
intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby 
to prejudice the health or survival of the population”.139 Article 35(3) of the same Protocol 
provides that “[i]t is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are 
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
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environment without specifications,140 and does not subordinate its own application to 
the existence of a prejudice to the health or survival of the population.141 The British 
Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict also notes that “while Article 35 relates to all 
methods of warfare whether on land, sea, or in the air wherever in the world they are 
utilized, Article 55 only relates to environmental damage on the territory or in the 
territorial sea of a state party to the conflict”.142 Apart from this, however, the two 
provisions present more similarities than differences and their common core is the 
prohibition of “warfare which is intended, or may be expected to have widespread, long-
term and severe effects on the natural environment”.143 Note also that neither Article 
35(3) nor Article 55(1) contain any reference to military necessity, which therefore does 
not constitute a limit to their application.
If the inclusion of the environmental articles in Additional Protocol I was historically 
due to the serious damage to the flora caused during the Vietnam War,144 it is 
uncontroversial that the provisions in question also extend to the fauna.145 Articles 35(3) 
and 55 protect animals not only directly as a component of the “natural environment”, 
but also indirectly by preserving the ecosystem in which they live. The damage must be 
“intended” or “expected”, which also includes damage to the fauna incidental to an attack 
on a military objective: if the damage is “widespread, long-term and severe”, the attack 
would be unlawful even if the principles of distinction and proportionality are not 
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breached.146 If it appears from the travaux préparatoires that “long-term” has to be 
interpreted as referring to a period of years or decades, there is no indication of what 
“widespread” or “severe” mean in the context of Protocol I. According to Rogers, “[a]n 
examination of the various commentaries on Protocol I leads one to infer that ‘severe’ 
means prejudicing the continued survival of the civilian population or involving the risk 
of major health problems and that ‘widespread’ means more than the standard of several 
hundred square kilometres considered in connection with the ENMOD Convention”.147 
Only exceptionally, therefore, will the provisions under examination protect animals. It 
has been argued, for instance, that “the destruction of all members of a species which 
occupies a limited region may be ‘long-term’ and ‘severe’ since it is irreversible” but not 
necessarily “widespread” “if the range of the species is spatially restricted”.148 It is also 
worth recalling that Ethiopia withdrew a claim related to the migration or loss of wild 
animals that had been included in its Claim 7 for environmental damage before the 
EECC.149
The customary status of the environmental provisions of Additional Protocol I is 
questionable. The EECC appears to have implicitly regarded them as customary, as it 
rejected Ethiopia’s claims of unlawful damage to environmental resources committed by 
Eritrea because the destruction fell “below the standard of widespread and long-lasting 
environmental damage required for liability under international humanitarian law” (the 
Commission did not hold relevant the fact that Eritrea had not ratified Additional Protocol 
I).150 According to the ICTY Final Report on the NATO bombing campaign against 
Yugoslavia, Article 55 of Additional Protocol I “may … reflect current customary 
law”.151 The ICJ’s view is ambiguous: in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of 
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court first stated that Articles 35 and 55 
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“embody a general obligation to protect the natural environment against widespread, 
long-term and severe environmental damage”, and then conceded that these provisions 
are “powerful constraints” only for the States having subscribed to them.152 Draft 
Principle 8 of the ILC Draft Principles on the Protection of the environment in relation to 
armed conflict, as adopted in 2015, contains language softer than that of Additional 
Protocol I and provides that “[c]are shall be taken to protect the natural environment 
against widespread, long-term and severe damage”.153 As to State practice, several States 
have maintained that the two environmental provisions of Additional Protocol I reflect 
customary international law154 and have included them in their military manuals and 
national legislations, although the language varies.155 On the other hand, France, the 
United Kingdom and the United States deny that the provisions under examination have 
achieved customary status.156 The United States, in particular, claims that they are “too 
broad and ambiguous”.157 In its official response to the publication of the ICRC Study, 
the United States argued that the Study’s conclusions on the customary status of the 
prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare that are intended or may be 
expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment 
are flawed, as they do not accurately assess the practice of specially affected States, they 
examine “only limited operational practice” which did not reach the required degree of 
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damage, and they offer no evidence of opinio juris.158 In Washington’s view, only the 
destruction of the environment carried out wantonly is prohibited, although “methods and 
means of attack should be employed with due regard to the protection and preservation 
of the natural environment”.159
As to non-international armed conflicts, it is to be noted that a proposal by Australia 
to include a provision similar to Article 35(3) in Additional Protocol II was rejected.160 
According to the ICRC Study, customary international law prohibiting major damage to 
the natural environment in non-international armed conflict might emerge “in due 
course”.161 The ICRC Guidelines on the Protection of the Environment in Times of 
Armed Conflict encourage the parties to a non-international armed conflict “to apply the 
same rules that provide protection to the environment in international armed conflict” and 
urge states “to incorporate such rules in their military manuals and instructions on the 
laws of war in a way that does not discriminate on the basis of how the conflict is 
characterized”.162
Articles 35(3) and 55 of Additional Protocol I are not the only environmental 
provisions of the law of armed conflict. Under Article I(1) of the Convention on the 
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques (En-Mod Convention), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1976 and 
opened for signature in 1977, the parties agree “not to engage in military or any other 
hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or 
severe effects as a means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party”.163 
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The techniques referred to in Article I are defined in Article II as those “for changing – 
through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes – the dynamics, composition or 
structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of 
outer space”.164 Examples of such techniques are – according to the second understanding 
submitted by the UN Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the General 
Assembly together with the Convention – “earthquakes; tsunamis; an upset in the 
ecological balance of a region; changes in weather patterns (clouds, precipitation, 
cyclones of various types, and tornadic storms); changes in climate patterns; changes in 
ocean currents; changes in the state of the ozone layer; and changes in the state of the 
ionosphere”.165 The Final Declaration of the 1992 Second Review Conference of the 
Parties to the En-Mod Convention declares that the Convention is applicable to the use 
of herbicides if such use “upsets the ecological balance of a region, thus causing 
widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury 
to another State Party”.166 A use of herbicides aimed at causing the extermination of bees, 
for instance, could fall under the prohibitive rules of the En-Mod Convention if its 
purpose is to produce environmental modifications through the loss of all the plants that 
bees pollinate and of the animals that eat those plants. The manipulation, however, must 
be “deliberate” and not be the collateral result of an attack on a military objective.167 The 
damage caused by the hostile use of the environmental modification technique must also 
be inflicted to the territory of another State Party to the En-Mod Convention: damage to 
areas beyond national jurisdiction, to the territory of a State that has not ratified the 
Convention and even to the territory of the state using the environmental modification 
technique is not prohibited.168
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The ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law ambiguously argues 
that, although the customary status of the En-Mod Convention is unclear, “there is 
sufficiently widespread, representative and uniform practice to conclude that the 
destruction of the natural environment may not be used as a weapon”.169
4. CONCLUSIONS AND THE WAY AHEAD
Greater attention needs to be paid to the protection of animals during armed conflict, 
an issue that the jus in bello has yet to address in a systematic manner. While the law of 
peacetime now includes several treaties aimed at protecting animals,170 there are only a 
handful of international humanitarian law rules that specifically address them, and they 
apply only in exceptional circumstances. Furthermore, with the exceptions of the 
principle of unnecessary suffering (in the reinterpretation suggested above) and of Article 
35(3) of Additional Protocol I, both general and specific provisions adopt an 
anthropocentric approach and primarily aim to protect the interests of humans, not the 
welfare of animals. The language used to refer to animals in the law of armed conflict 
suggests itself that the interests of animals are completely extraneous to the normative 
framework of the existing rules. Indeed, when it categorizes them as “property” or 
“objects”, the jus in bello objectifies animals even though, unlike inanimate things, they 
are sentient beings with their own interests, which can take independent actions and are 
capable of subjective perception and suffering.
What are the possible remedies to these inadequacies? Belligerents may conclude 
special agreements “at any time” in relation to “all matters concerning which they may 
deem it suitable to make separate provision”.171 Customary international law rules 
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specifically protecting animals in armed conflict could also eventually sediment, although 
it has been observed that “compelling evidence for the existence of any customary 
principle concerning welfare should probably not be expected since state practice 
regarding the protection of animals is almost invariably attributable to domestic standards 
and sensibilities rather than to any sense of international legal obligation, rendering proof 
of opinio juris extremely difficult”.172
Finally, a new treaty providing for specific rules protecting animals in armed conflict 
could be adopted, but the drafters would have significant challenges to face at the 
negotiating table. In particular, they would have to agree on the treaty’s normative 
purpose and on its subjective scope of application, i.e. what categories of animals it 
should encompass.173 Dogs, elephants, camels, dolphins, cats, whales and mammals in 
general would probably be unchallenged candidates for inclusion. More debatable would 
be its extension to all vertebrates, not to mention smaller creatures like insects. In any 
case, it is likely that different species would be assigned different levels of protection.
It was, however, not the purpose of this article to canvass any particular solution to 
what this author perceives as a fault line in the law of armed conflict. The aim was rather 
to identify and question the traditional limits of this discipline in relation to animals. We 
need to abandon our traditional perceptions and move towards a more animal friendly 
conception of the law of armed conflict. Determining how exactly we can do so – how 
we can balance human interests with those of animals in war – is another task for another 
day.
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